We lost the war to China in 1962.
Was it worthy of being analyzed as a war? And put up such Himalayan
psychological, defeatist dab on our young and exultant sense of nationalism?
‘War’ is unjustifiably too big an expression for these basically
poorly planned skirmishes in the barren Himalayan terrain, where hardcore war
strategies and ironclad nationalism melted into the anonymous mists of those
far-fetched undefined territories. We had no plan at all, except the vague idea
about our boundary lines. They had a stronger idea about what they thought
belonged to them. It was merely a school-boyish mad rush into uninhabited
wilderness to find some larger meanings which no side had a definite idea
about. So the anecdotes are full of chance skirmishes, futile bravados and
disproportionate hoopla about the proportions of battle engagements.
As a newly independent country, we
accepted the word 'war' to qualify on the scale of capability to defend the
new-found sovereignty and territories. This mere acceptance of the expression
'war' for those rudimentary childish pursuits in the wild snowy trails has done
us more psychological and historical harm than the real casualties on the
battle field. The stage was too hazy and distant. In the wide nook and corners
of India, we grew up with this massive war defeat scar that was in fact in
terrible disproportion to the scale of real operations. Admitted, China rushed
in to grab a considerable proportion of the territories in Aksai Chin where our
claim of ownership was just stamped by symbolic patrols and traditional belief.
But losing a chunk of land over which we never had the time and capability to
fully stamp our ownership, does no justice to the fact of accepting some free
runs in barren lands as a humiliating defeat in a full-scale war. We just lost
a few not so pitched battles, that’s all! We ourselves get hyper about
the word 'war' to somehow exaggerate the scale of military operations (we as
the defendants of our territories and Chinese as the greedy grabbers) to
legalize our victimhood and their crime act. And for this we just accept the
insulting defeat in a bloody war.
Fifty years on, what is the
ground position in the actually held territories? We have all the reasons to
smile and give ourselves a pat on the back and bury that scar, even if it means
with a cosmetic sense of belated belief. The strength of any military unit is directly
proportional to its real-life practice in the field. In mountain warfare we far
outdo China. Thanks to Messers Pakistan and Co. we have been busy in mountain
warfare for more than six decades. When you are fighting against the invisible
enemy and try to keep your humanitarian records clean as well, it really gives
you the bloodiest war drills. It has been going on against insurgencies at both
the Eastern and Western fronts in the toughest Himalayan terrains. It has been
at tremendous costs at the man and material fronts. But believe me it has put
our forces through such fiery experiences that it can be really counted as one
of the most battle-worthy in mountainous regions. Chinese military bragging
meanwhile has been limited to nationalist gung-ho, hoopla and technological
innovations. But there is a great difference between getting starry eyed over a
new warfare gadget and getting into the real mess of a bloody situation where
you have to kill the hidden enemy, spare you people and keep the thing of law
in your mind in the snowy heights. We are a far superior military force, on
account of our constant real-life drills, in the terrain that are in dispute
with China.
Indian Navy still scores over
China. It is not about having the biggest dagger in the world. What matters is
that your dagger should be just long enough to reach the enemy’s heart
and you should have, first, the intention, and second, the strength to push it
that deep. I mean the nukes! Equipped with this deterrence, we are logically
capable of engaging Chinese in--both limited and not-so-limited--conventional
mountain warfare. We have invested so much of money into air warfare
equipments, at the cost of depriving millions of people of basic amenities of
life. However, it at the minimum gives us all the reasons to practically
maintain our supply chains in the toughest terrain. So Indians forget about a
few skirmishes lost to China in 1962 and be optimistic about future.