It's not the era for wars and terrorism

At the start of this write-up, let me clarify that whatever I write as a critic or a rudimentary (amateur) analyst is borne by a positive feeling for a strong, prosperous, peaceful, progressive, secular, democratic India. If I’m viewed to be criticizing individuals and ideologies, that is driven by my right to contribute to the progress of this great nation through ideas and discussion.

I have deep respect for the Indian armed forces for their patriotism, professional capabilities, secular structure, and minding their own business just and just for defending our motherland. The criticism in this article, if at all it comes to that, must be about civilian leadership because it’s very unfortunate that all governments have failed to supply our armed forces with suitable weapons that would do full justice to their deep sense of duty. Doubting the abilities of our forces would be like doubting the entire core structure of our nationhood.

I grew up in a Haryana village. We have so many people from our farming community serving in the armed forces; many from our extended family as well. We grew up honoring this noble profession. We would salute while standing by the road watching the convoys of military vehicles pass by the village. I still do. Whatever I write here is no critique of the Indian armed forces in any way. An Indian soldier will die for motherland even in cloth shoes on icy tops, like it happened in 1962 in the war against China. So the discussion is from the angle of the civilian leadership’s management of our forces, the equipment that is provided to them and the indigenous research and development. Weapon or no weapon, an Indian soldier is always there to fight for the motherland. How I wish the civilian leadership were as noble, selfless and honorable in the service of Ma Bharti. 

I speak as an Indian, a common citizen of mother India. This is not the era for terrorism. Nobody knows it better than us how it feels to suffer from terrorism sponsored by outside elements and countries. What I write here in this article is not limited to the scope of a healthy critique of our political leadership. It’s meant to raise genuine questions, the questions that need open answers. And open answers lead the way to solutions—concrete and effective measures to counter the menace of terrorism. 

The murder of innocent tourists at Pahalgam in Kashmir is a blatant sin. Ironically, now both the ruling side and the opposition will try to take political advantage in their own way. Ironically, politics is the craft of taking advantage of a tragedy. Pakistan’s mischief is well known. Mourning over it is meaningless. The question arises as to why there was no security around an isolated tourist area, where about 2000 tourists were present at that moment. If media reports are accepted, the militants asked people their names and religion before killing them. It means they had enough time. Not only this, some were asked to recite Kalma. It means there was no hit and run in the episode. It was free. This type of assurance is possible only when there is a belief that the security arrangement is very loose. That is, the security guards must have been far away. Therefore, before jumping into the fire of Hindu-Muslim binary, we will have to ask our government the question, ‘How was such a big loophole left in the security of the common citizens of India?’

Already communal passions have flared up and there are reports that some Kashmiri students have been targeted in universities outside their home state. In this regard, Osho’s statement is meaningful: ‘There are two types of people in the world. There is a very old Sufi story that a foolish and a knowledgeable person passed through a forest. Both forgot the way. It’s stormy weather. There was a big peal of thunder and flash of lightning. The fabric of darkness was cut for a moment. The fool saw the sizzle and fire in the sky. The knowledgeable person but saw the road below when the lightning struck. He saw the path to move. The former was simply lost in the dark after that brief dazzle of light.’ Therefore, the fools will see the fire of religious frenzy in this tragedy. But the knowledgeable man will see the way in this. And the paths open up only after raising the appropriate questions.

As was widely expected within India and outside, India struck with good measure. It was meant to be a surgical strike, punitive as well as symbolic, to deter Pakistan from pursuing its anti-India terror agenda. It was assumed that it will be Balakot 2.0. But Pakistan retaliated leading to a four-day high-tech air warfare. To think that it’s Indo-Pak conflict only would be too simplistic. It’s as much China’s war as Pakistan’s. And that makes it a very difficult situation. There is a possibility that China egged General Munir to plot Pahalgam—not directly though; but by pampering the anti-India bug in him, giving him an assurance of backing and support in the event of a wider flare-up.

In the event of provocative killings of its civilians, India would retaliate by hitting the terrorist camps like in the past. They knew it. It was written on the board. So China would obviously welcome such case studies for testing its weapons against India. It would give China an opportunity to test their latest weaponry against India using Pakistan as a proxy and hence target India’s critical assets. It would open the way for a wider conflict. Was it planned this way? If it was, then looking at Pahalgam massacre in abstract would be a folly.

On the geostrategic chessboard, there is no friend; there are just pawns. Pakistan is an operational pawn for China to keep India engaged in a regional conflict—to forestall a situation where India becomes a reasonably strong adversary to hyphenate China in a regional rivalry and thus cut its emergence as a global player. So China smartly takes out the hyphen between itself and India (which America has been trying to insert and consolidate) and inserts it between India and Pakistan.

The four-day conflict took a shape that is not strictly as per our calculations. Chinese J-10 aircraft plus PL-15 missile combo reportedly proved to be a good deterrent on the first night. India claimed huge success in targeting terrorist camps, killing scores of terrorists. But the foreign media reported that—citing Dassault’s information provided to the Reuters—that India lost fighter jets including Rafael on the first day. The Indian public was in denial mode. How did this happen, if it was true. The much-publicized Rafael jet is a star to many Indian eyes. In contrast, JF-10 was under-publicized. There was no advertising rhetoric about its air prowess. Not much was known about its performance in actual confrontation. Publicity maybe is good for posturing, but certain things are better left untold. That creates the element of surprise—a key factor in any type of warfare ranging from sword ambushes to space fights. The modest JF-10 happens to have an exceptionally long radar range. So the Rafael pilot probably misjudged the rival jet’s combat envelope. Further, it was circulated in media that the PL-15 missile, which China exports to Pakistan, has a range of 145 km only. Probably it was a booby trap of misquoted facts—in all probability, it was a PL-15 missile having a range of about 300 km. Our pilot might have thought that he is out of rival jet’s target range, thus focusing on attack only. It left a defense loophole. In any case, there was no air-to-air missile on Rafael because France hasn’t given us the source code necessary to customize the payload to include air-to-air defensive missiles on it in alignment with air-to-surface attack missiles. To us, it’s Chinese cunningness; to them, it’s cleverness. So to sum it up, keeping a low profile for your weapons might not give you publicity but enables you to surprise the opponent with good effect.

According to the Telegraph reports, an ambush based on cutting edge new technological warfare was unleashed on us by Pakistan-China combo. A hit where all expected parameters were left untouched. The hit happened from a new platform for which Rafael’s defense system wasn’t sufficient. I cannot accept that it was our pilot’s error. It was plain, cunning outsmarting. The Western media reports say that due to these unexpected hits our fleet had to be kept 300 km away from the border. They say that without air cover it proved to be an unsustainable operation. They are many who are envious of India’s rise and they are presenting it as our ‘strategic embarrassment’.

According to Western defense experts, it was Chinese-Pakistani integrated warfare involving artificial intelligence and satellite sensors—a deadly trap which was beyond our calculation at the start of confrontation and when the alleged losses to our machines happened. ‘The kill bombs it never saw,’ that’s Telegraph’s version. I know they have their own agendas for setting up narratives to make us appear losers. My purpose behind quoting this is—beyond the questions of it being true or not—that even if it’s not so at the moment, it will definitely happen in future. It’s no longer Indo-Pak. It’s Indo-PakChina. We have to accept this challenge. And for handling this, we also need to have a plus on our side. So prudence demands that we make it Indo-America plus democracies. We can no longer afford to be amused spectators as the Western block fights against Russian autocracy in Ukraine. At least we need to tilt our balance towards democracies from the middle position that we maintain at the moment. Because it’s primarily Indo-China (the biggest democracy pitted against the mightiest autocracy); just that the front happens to be Pakistan at the moment.

We have to understand the nimbu-mirchi symbolism has no place in modern electronic and technical warfare. There are reports they had jammers. It was sixth generation warfare, beyond radar sensor based target locking. It involved AI-based untraceable satellite locking. Rafael’s defense platform failed to track it. Now some defense analysts don’t see our air superiority in as clear terms as they did earlier. At least there are some doubts about it in the minds of the critics.   

Through our proud airmen we have so far been able to maintain air superiority—the lack of equipment being compensated by their bravery and patriotism—over Pakistan. Why put it to risk when all you want is destroying a few madrasas run by fundamentalists? Expose your air force flank only if you have a wider engagement in mind.  

If the reports of downed Indian jets are true, to me it’s a disaster—to lose such high value assets to break a few madrasas and kill some jihadis; just for symbolism (because buildings and low-level terrorist cadres are highly replaceable) to get political gains is not a wise decision. I would have digested the fact of losing such critical machines had we attacked their military installations on the first day itself (because terror camps sprout from the Pakistani military establishment). That’s the root cause. It seems to me that losing such  major machines to crack down some madrasas is paying too big a price for small fishes.

And history will be a fairer judge of these happenings. Those like me who question will be viewed more kindly, not taken as traitors by the troll army of fake patriots. But I’m feeling very-very sad about all this. To ask questions is the strength of our democracy. Was there any democracy without opposition? Pahalgam happens despite critical intelligence inputs about the terrorists scouting the town a few days ago. Why wasn’t this lapse owned? And to hide this critical failure, you again go for the symbolic jingoism of hitting some madrasas and turn the political wind in your favor. See war is not an ‘event’ as the current leadership is expert at. It’s bloody war. They thought it will be a small thing like Balakot and then they will carry the political momentum into the upcoming state elections in Bihar and Bengal. But the first night itself you lose such assets. There are scores who I have heard saying that it was basically meant as a voter-winning show. If a war it has to be, let it be a real war, not symbolic. I know those who support the government on principle—without looking at the pros and cons from the real national interests—won’t see this aspect. But even the loyalists have to understand that those who question also stand for Bharat Ma, if not for the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister isn’t Bharat Mata as they are trying to make it.

A professor, who doesn’t want to be named, said to me, ‘Mark my words, for temporary political gains, they will leave us with many-many long term social pains. And an ideological hatred sows the seeds of blindness in the society, which destroys it in some decades, like Pakistan got destroyed. We are going in the same direction and the Pakis will succeed finally even if they get destroyed completely. Their success would be to make India a bigger Pakistan, a society based on religious hatred, where education takes a back seat, where the youths start roaming the streets like hooligans. We might destroy the Pakis with bombs but the devils have left their poison of communal hatred in our blood through little-little bites over the decades. The poison will spread, the communal parties will form governments a few times, but the society will suffer like they did in Pakistan. Ideological hatred is permanent blindness. The divisive core doesn’t stop at the communal borders. It spreads to eat more. To think that it will stop at communal divides only would be a folly: like to think that a forest fire will burn the weeds only. No, it will eat even healthy plants. When they put up communal politics with such good rewards, the caste politics always gets ill-inspiration to harness the rewards at more fronts, like caste fronts, and flare up more social divisions. No wonder by burning communal coexistence they are burning caste cohesion as well within the Hindu society. Only a composite culture can grow like America did. But now even America will also slump down because their current President is hitting that social cohesion.’

A war devours the interests of common people on both sides. The big and mighty—those who start wars—are mostly out of the harm’s way. In reckless Pakistani shelling thousands of our common citizens in Poonch, Uri, Rajouri and Jammu had to flee from their homes. Dozens died. A man was picking up his two sons from their school, aged 9 and 11, when their vehicle was struck by a shell. Both boys died. He was lying in the ICU unaware of their death. Hundreds of houses destroyed. Those who sit far from the border might watch the exaggerated, misinformed war facts with excitement on the television, but ask the ones who come directly in the ranger of fire on the border. Or ask a soldier. So given these facts and ground realities, I feel good that better sense prevailed  after four days...the conflict ended. The ceasefire. I’m glad that it gets replaced by political intrigues and one-upmanship. At least it doesn’t directly kill people and destroy their houses like war does.

It would be a folly to look at the confrontation from the angle of India-Pakistan binary only. It was actually a Chinese proxy war using Pakistan as a pawn. And by agreeing to a ceasefire, India has saved itself from getting embroiled in unnecessary strife that would have halted our path to development.

Further, one would agree to a ceasefire either due to a weak position or with major takeaways. I believe in our army’s capabilities, so it’s natural to accept that we have major takeaways from the confrontation. We will be waiting for the government to clarify these. The war is on terror basically. So let’s see what are the conditions under which the government of India agreed to a hasty, unexpected ceasefire so suddenly.

The intense air-conflict and the unexpected, sudden ceasefire raise a few critical questions.

India has always rejected any third party role in Indo-Pak affairs. Despite this, the ceasefire announcement was made first by President Trump. Does it mean that India is finally ready for mediation? And if so, doesn’t the abandonment of such a long-term policy indicate and raise questions about our ability to dictate the ceasefire terms?

Pakistan broke the ceasefire within three hours. Doesn’t this ill-enthusiasm raise a question: Has it accepted the ceasefire from as weak a position as is being reported? Because a truly weakened enemy would think twice before breaking such a hard-earned ceasefire for which it has pleaded as they say it has.

Third, India has always categorically said: ‘No talks on terrorism.’ But as per ceasefire terms (mostly coming from the tweets of the American president and his high-ranking officials), it’s being reported that India and Pakistan will hold further talks at a neutral venue. Does it mean that we are now ready for holding talks on terrorism with Pakistan? We the citizens of India need these answers.

It’s as much between India and Pakistan as it’s between America and China. The civilian leadership of Pakistan thanks America for facilitating the ceasefire. It gives the message: America is still the global  sarpanch having power and influence to manage critical world situations, which adds another feather to its claim to sole global supremacy. It obviously gets contested by China. So they maybe encourage the military leadership of Pakistan, which is under their direct influence, to break the ceasefire and thus nullify the ceasefire credit earned by America. That’s how it played out for a few nights after the ceasefire announcement. But I’m glad that the parties involved realized the nature of this situation which was taking a bad course.

Pakistan is caught in its internal binary: civilian leadership supported by America and the military pushed on misadventures by China. These are very complex wars and looking at them as simplistic Indo-Pak affairs about terrorism would be too naïve.

The problem is, this global trade has interlinked the destinies of all the countries to such an extent that now it’s a big joint family with its kitchen utensil noises, sas-bahu bickerings, sibling rivalries, gossips, jealousies, completion, etc. A big bickering house where living separately and living together are equally difficult. America has its own trading interests including weapons trade. Starlink and crypto-currency are the pathways leading to a new post-dollar financial order. Did Pakistan and India play into trading hands, realized the possible trading gains and agreed to the ceasefire? 

A belligerent, jingoistic leader will always draw you to some strife of sorts, mostly internal to keep the political dynamics tilting in his favor, and sometimes external strife also because lots of internal strife will spring a situation where external threats and counter-measures crop up automatically. Things will arrive at a point when he has to prove and validate his image, necessitating a war scenario with the external enemy. But it gets cashed by China-Pakistan nexus to aggravate the conflict. Xi Jinping is reserved, silent and very effective in practice. Maybe that’s possible in a secretive regime, while a leader in a democracy has to create a rhetoric to win votes. But it has its disadvantages. Like in this case, to keep its strong, patriotic image the top Indian leadership was almost forced to go for a limited strike, which was used by the secretive leaders in Pak-China nexus to escalate it to a wider conflict.

There are two scenarios with powerful people. First, you are simply powerful—unquestionably, like in autocracies. The entire system speaks of power, manipulation, authority and subjugation of the dissenting voice. Second, when you have to act and show to be powerful—questionably, like in a democracy where there are checks and balances and you have to transgress into the domains of counterbalancing institutions and authorities. To prove your mettle, you are constantly making a steely image. You have to present proofs that you are powerful because the system expects you to be a public servant number one but you are looking to stamp your authority as a powerful ruler. In the latter’s attempts, there is bound to crop a situation where you are forced to take risk—and hence endanger peace and progress—to prove what you have so far claiming to be. In such tight situations, allowing things to just ease out will be viewed as your acting out of character by those who now worship you as a cult leader and expect very tough actions from you. You have raised the bar of their expectations. So much so that you might even be forced to go into a war to keep that strongman image. So for a democratic leader it’s not suitable to strive to own a powerful cultman status. It doesn’t fit the democratic mould; creates frictions within; invites unnecessary troubles. Autocracy within democracy is fundamentally contradictory.

‘This is not the era for war,’ a powerful leader in a democracy once said. Agreed. But it should also not be the era for war against political opponents and ideological critics. Why this war ‘within’ that goes 24 by 7 all through the year?

A leader who has cast himself in a branded aggressive image—strong, belligerent and unsparing—creates an obligation for himself to keep that image cast in solid mould. His behavior becomes cast along expected lines. With elections to Bengal and Bihar approaching, the adversary knew he needed a nationalistic hyperbole like Balakot strikes after Pulwama attack. It raises emotions—but strategically does very little against terrorism—and attracts voters’ fancy. In my calculation, nothing happened at random—right from General Munir’s verbal assault about Kashmir being India’s jugular vein to Pahalgam attack to India’s expected surgical strikes to Pakistan’s well-prepared counter attack. It was a trap, expecting the nationalistic Indian leadership to toe the line into an act of retaliation against the killings. General Munir makes inflammatory statement leading to Pahalgam carnage. It results in the strong Indian leader ordering a bit bigger Balakot type strike to consolidate his powerful image. It was a plan by the enemy. A trap. Because the enemy knew that the strong Indian leader has nurtured a cult following around himself. To maintain it he has to go for a strike, a tangible proof of his ability to strike deep in Pakistan, which would be later cashed during elections. And out of darkness comes J-10 with its PL-15 missiles—the machine and the weapon having a vague credibility, not sold with marketing hyperboles and aggressive posturing. An ambush. The strong Indian leader has to operate unlike his normal avatar now to avoid being predicted to good effect by the enemies. A leader who becomes too predictable turns vulnerable to the enemies in geostrategic warfare because they can plan their strategy as per his expected and sure-shot behavior in a particular situation. Predictability is an asset to be a good, common man; but unpredictability is an asset for a leader. If a leader becomes too predictable in his behavior, it means he has imprisoned himself in a closed set of beliefs, a rigid mindset or a frigid ideology. In this way, he loses the space to avail more options, which could have been used without the fear of losing his image.

There is a fierce critic of our top leadership. He seems glad about the way things have taken shape in this episode. I try to balance his judgment but he is unsparing, ‘Raja sahib, I believe in our army’s ability. I also believe in the news channels that are claiming that all airbases in Pakistan have been destroyed. Now when Pakistan is pleading for peace, as the patriotic anchors shout, why are you showing mercy on them? Why this ceasefire? Why not take PoK? The honorable Home Minster had effectively thundered in the parliament that we will take back PoK by fighting. We are with you, Sir! Please lead us to a clear, decisive victory with your broad chest.’ I try to make him see the critical situation. ‘No! I have to believe in my Home Minister! We pay taxes for his entourage and parliamentary functioning. So what he says in that august house is very important to me. And it was the right time to get back PoK!’  

We have reasons to feel that we lost at the diplomatic front. At the start of Ukraine war, we maintained a neutral but pro-Putin stance. More was expected from the world’s largest democracy. I think India committed a mistake in not balancing its position in Ukraine-Russia war. Yes, we depend on Russian defense equipment and due to that we can’t condemn Russia outrightly. But we could have done a bit more than just making pacifist statements like ‘this is not the era for war’. Here a democracy has been under attack by an autocracy. It is the violation of a country’s sovereignty. Ukraine has more democratic backing in the world. Democracy is still the international norm—though rapidly losing its grip—and autocratic regimes are off-the-path governments. So had we taken a more definite pro-democracy stance in Russia-Ukraine affair, it would have gone in our favor in case of a conflict with China-Pakistan nexus. Europe was hurt by India’s stance. Now they too waited and watched and made pacifist statements of neutral nature. In fact, right in the middle of the conflict, Pakistan even got IMF bailout package. A diplomatic win for them.

We would like to know about the takeaways from the conflict. Why such hasty ceasefire when we were winning at all fronts as the reports say? I know both sides claim victory in a confrontation. Despite all the exaggerated claims in the media on both sides, we know we have inflicted good damage. But despite that we have to accept that Pakistan has deterrence even in conventional war; that’s, it’s no pushover in its China allied avatar. So we will have to think seriously before going for symbolic, vote-capturing, surgical strikes after an act of terror in India —like Balakot—and claim victory later. We will have to think in larger perspective—to root out the problem, either through covert operations coupled with diplomatic push or an all out war. No more symbolic strikes. They cost too much. Surgical strikes seem politically suitable but the problem of terrorism stays the same. We would very much like to know the specific anti-terror takeaways because we have lost men, material and peace in this confrontation. Despite our punitive strikes, the Pakistani military and public seem to be as adamant as ever as the ceasefire violations for a few nights and the ongoing terrorist encounters in Kashmir prove. So what was the concrete anti-terror takeaway?  

The political leadership is saying that all the objectives of Operation Sindoor have been met. I ask, ‘At what cost?’ If we sum up the geostrategic, diplomatic and the alleged loss of critical machines in the operation, can we still say that we have achieved all the targets? Has the terrorist network in Pakistan been dented beyond repair? Or have we inflicted enough damage to Pakistani military facilities to force them to change their state policy of using terrorism as a weapon against India? Suppose I decide to kill a man and in doing so if I get some of my accomplices killed but succeed in killing that man, should I be jubilant in saying that I met my objectives? Has Pakistan agreed to stop using terrorism as a state policy? That I think was the main objective of this confrontation, not just breaking their terrorist camps here and there. The camps will easily come up again unless they change their policy. Can we say that India achieved the target? Reports say that about hundred terrorists were killed. But won’t another 1000 crop up again if Pakistan doesn’t stop state-sponsored terrorism? So in what way this ‘achievement of targets’ can be clarified?

Indian armed forces have done us proud so many times. Their professional ethos and dedication are impeccable. But shouldn’t we be asking a question: Aren’t we unnecessarily dragging our armed forces into external conflicts to basically get internal electoral gains? It’s a very dangerous trend for the country’s safety. Army must be left out of politicking. At any cost. This is one institution where we cannot afford to have the political rot to creep in.

The initial strike was meant to show our determination to retaliate in the event of provocation. But the Indian media made it an entertainment show brimming with spicy, unsubstantiated information. It further boosted the symbolism of strike. The ground realities were different. Symbolism helps politically. But in warfare, there are limits. Here a show of imprudent symbolism will force you—even unprepared—into an unmanageable confrontation. The way the rulers in Pakistan are publicizing it, Pakistan will emerge more confident. Why give it such a chance in the first place? It was going down pretty well. I hope a more confident Pakistan will be more responsible as well.

The strategy of using international armed conflict as domestic political tool is quite risky. Things might go out of control, leading to a larger escalation which neither side wants but still gets drawn in to save their images before the domestic audience.

Taking the masses in emotional grip—through fueling phobia, rousing past glories, and offering golden dreams of patriotism—is very effective politically. It gets votes, no doubt. You get a savior image. The people hold high expectations from you and expect you to fulfill the promises you have made. So when there are thundering declarations in Parliament about claiming back PoK, the people clap, shower praises, vote for you. But what about achieving all these? Is it that easy, especially against the background of recent confrontation, where an unexpected ceasefire proves that Pakistan (plus China) is no pushover. It exposes one’s flank. And the critics will point out that your claims of military superiority are a bit exaggerated. So assuming that we will successfully carry out surgical strikes without Pakistani retaliation would be too impractical, almost wishful thinking. At the moment, the dream of getting back PoK is farther than it ever was in the past. Very sad to note it, it seems almost impossible in the present situation.

Pakistan was down-slope, we on the upslope, so the stalemate was surrounded by an acceptance in Pakistan as well as the world outside that India is too big a power now to be hyphenated with Pakistan any longer. This belief seems to have been dented. We can see that many countries are now taking Pakistan seriously. And in my humble opinion all this happened due to our over-belligerent leadership perpetually asserting its superiority from public platforms, which ultimately spun out this situation. And as can always be seen and proved, the ground realities are always different from what is claimed from public platforms. So a responsible leadership has to be careful regarding with what intensity the dream of greatness should be sold to the public. Of course, it can’t be abandoned altogether. But its mass-served version has to be diluted to avoid public backlash and disappointment. If not, the trolls will pour out their anger, like they did against our foreign secretary. They targeted him and his family. A MP Minister even targeted a Muslim woman army officer.

One of the more serious results of this recent confrontation is that India and Pakistan are now hyphenated after years of de-hyphenation on part of India through its economic growth. Now critics are discussing us in the same category as Pakistan. President Trump keeps taking jibes, suggesting India and Pakistan to sit on the same table, comparing India and Pakistan in the same vein, raising the issues of Kashmir mediation.  

The circumstances surrounding ceasefire have bred ample conspiracy theories. Trump has been making claims that all this was possible because both sides understood the rationale of trade benefits. It has been a most unexpected ceasefire where both sides have been claiming gains. It becomes very difficult to guess what actually happened. The Kirana hill theory, the Rafael downing story, the nuclear war theory, the trade theory, etc., etc.

Of course the world is as divided as ever. Hate and distrust remain the same. As the global sarpanch, Trump has decided that America will assert its authority through trade. Anything for trade. It might go to an extent that the American geo-strategy might take a U-turn for winning extra bucks at the trade front. If China lets America avail huge trade benefits, the latter might even change its stance on Taiwan and allow its merger with the mainland. It won’t be a war without the American backing. Trump himself has claims over Panama, Greenland and Canada—openly suggesting merger. It means he is open to others working out their occupation plans of similar nature. With one condition of course—provided he gets substantial trade benefits in return. Taiwan-China unification is nearer than it ever was in the past. Ukraine-Russia war has made such transgressions into other’s sovereignty almost common news—the UN almost defunct and such aggressions no longer carry the shock and moral disgust they once carried. Taiwan has to rethink. At least during Trump’s term, all they can do is to pray that China doesn’t attack during his term.

  As global sarpanch Trump seems to be balancing things in the Indian subcontinent—cutting India’s wings and adding some to Pakistan. It was evident during the current episode.

 Why didn’t the world side with us? The overhyped symbolism of strength and glory—in disproportion to the ground realities—that was unleashed in the world’s face in the form of Vishva Guru Brand India made even traditional friends uncomfortable. Be strong, work for it; why keep shouting that we are strong, we are strong? It irritates others. There is a fine line dividing self-glorious rhetoric and plain arrogance. In a time of crisis, the other countries would wait for a situation where the edges—which have been pricking their ego—get broken. Lesson: Don’t sell yourself at too big a price internationally. It becomes impractical to follow that image, or validate it.

According to the India Express, the Indian EAM said on May 18: ‘At the start of the operation, we had sent a message to Pakistan saying we are striking at terrorists’ infrastructure. We are not striking at the military. So the military has an option of standing out. They chose not to take that good advice.’ Is it a fairy tale world? This is shocking! Won’t such prior warning give them time to respond and launch air-to-air missiles? Where was the element of surprise? Or was it just expected to be a little drama to feed the domestic audience? Why do we forget that even Pakistani military also has to feed their audience? So naturally they retaliated. In any case, the top leadership of India was rabble rousing in Bihar in political rallies that we will do this, we will do that. Why shout and make them alert. Just do it, with good effect. If you are serious. But if there are added priorities of earning political laurels apart from destroying terrorist infrastructure of course you will declare it from public platforms. So naturally Pakistan was prepared that India will strike. And the prior information to them that we are going to strike only the terrorist camps was done under the assumption that the military would stay away, probably thinking India to be too powerful—afraid of escalation—allowing the political leadership of India harvest vast political gains from a symbolic fight against terrorism. Moreover, if you inform them before the strike, do you expect the top terrorists to be present there to be roasted? So the claim of killing hundreds of terrorists has to be taken with due caution.

Let’s come to the problems faced by our air force. Former senior air force officers have said publicly that our air force is hugely deficit in the number of squadrons and other critical equipment. The air force has been asking for 60 squadrons; they have only half of that. Expert committees have accepted the shortage of resources with the Indian air force required in handling adversaries like China and Pakistan in a dual front war. Hardly any steps have been taken in that direction. The current government has been in power for the last 11 years, sufficient time for bringing effective changes. They just can’t push the narratives back to past decades and put all blame on Congress. They have been in the chair for sufficient time. Sadly, asking questions is trolled as sedition.

Why so much aggressive defensiveness on any question related to Operation Sindoor? Why make any logical questioning of Operation Sindoor so-so scary? An Ashoka University professor is immediately arrested for raising questions in an academic and parliamentary language. Why? While a MP minister is allowed free space despite making obnoxious remarks against a woman military officer. Why? Does it prove that the system of justice—in alliance with police and politics—has two wings: one for the common people and the other for the politically privileged ones? These are serious questions that need to be asked.

The foreign media has quite different things to say in stark contrast to what our media tells us. Are they all wrong? Are we all right? Does it bound me, to prove my patriotism, to believe only our side of the story? I know truth lies somewhere in between what they say and we say. When I raise questions and express skepticism, I don’t do it with a gloating glee. I say it with pain and sadness for the welfare of our country; I say it with concern as an Indian.

Why politicize even the matter of sending all-party delegations abroad to clarify our stand on the issue? Why choose for the opposition parties? Why not allow them to send their candidates of their choice? It’s expected in a democracy.  

Where did India lose the plot? From Pahalgam massacre to the beginning of the armed conflict, the world was sympathetic to our cause. But right in the middle of the conflict, On May 9 Pakistan gets an IMF bailout package. The IMF board of directors has 25 members including India. None of them stood by India? Why? Was Pakistan diplomatically successful in presenting itself as the victim of Indian aggression after the Indian strike? Did the hyperbolic Indian media, making false claims such as capturing Karachi and Islamabad, create a scene in which Pakistan seemed to be too severely penalized even for a sinful act like Pahalgam? The Indian media’s behavior in recent years has dented its global image. But after this misinformation its image has been further tarnished.

On a question, did we lose Rafael jets, the air marshal replied that there are losses on both sides in a war, but our pilots are safe. No clear denial about the Indian jets being downed by the enemy. In this confrontation, weapons from countries like Israel, India, Turkey, America, France, Pakistan, China and Russia were used. It made it almost a testing ground for various weapons in a war situation. The relative performance of various types of military equipment is the main focus of the Western media. The arms industry is a big player in this. When President Trump raises the angle of trade in Indo-Pak ceasefire, he means arms and weapons basically.

Due to Balakot strikes in 2019, Pakistani air force got a chance to test their China-collaborated electronic warfare system during their counter operations against India. They have been building on that lead since then and included artificial intelligence in the platform. The enhanced platform was used—with full Chinese connivance—during the recent conflict. And with good effect, if we consider the Western defense experts’ views on this. Now the main question is: Did we achieve something substantial in our war against terrorism? Is it suitable to take symbolism to this length to expose your air force for such non-military targets in the first place?  

There is a thing called espionage—good results at low cost without exposing high-value military assets. But espionage doesn’t give you hyperbolic political masala to cash at election rallies. Another question is: Has Pakistan been deterred by Operation Sindoor? A comprehensive, logical, objective assessment of the Western media reports makes one feel that the answer isn’t a clear ‘yes’, if not a firm ‘no’. Because it’s not Pakistan alone. It’s China plus Pakistan and the former has integrated radar jamming electronic warfare in the PAF. It’s basically multi-domain electro-magnetic warfare having an edge over conventional radar technology. It’s operated in a digital ecosystem involving satellite links and using beyond visual missiles (BVM). This digital ecosystem gets supplemented with J10 aircrafts which have very strong radar technology.

The one takeaway for us can be the exposure to this new adversary set-up during the brief conflict. It gives us a clear idea of what lies ahead of us. We cannot commit the mistake of considering Pakistan too weak. No enemy is weak. They all have their USPs in terms of posing risks. But the main matter of concern is Indo-Pak military hyphenation again after almost two decades of India going up too rapidly, thus putting Pakistan almost out of league in comparison with India in any regard. This re-hyphenation provides ground for China to test their latest weapons in the limited, conventional zone that this Indo-Pak rivalry opens up for them. There are reports that the PAF will get J-35A (fifth generation) even before their induction in the PLA. Pakistan is also set to receive most advanced long-range PL-15 missiles. China is also aiming trading opportunities for its weapons through the prolonged Indo-Pak conflict apart from the objective of containing India through Pakistan. If these weapons give a tough fight in limited Indo-Pak conflicts, they get automatic publicity and hence purchase orders.

 The government is saying that Operation Sindoor is not over, it’s merely suspended. Doesn’t it leave it open-ended and liable to be mismanaged (leaving it to be resumed for some politically suitable reasons instead of logical military strategy) in future?

Whatever might be the exact level of their deterrence, the Pakistani army is cashing it very well. General Mushir is a Field Marshal now. Presently, the Pak army’s authority seems to be restored—on the basis of exaggerated claims of damage to India. But there is an iota of truth behind the mountain of falsehood. And whatever was achieved by them—despite our more genuine damage claims—is sufficient to allow the army to assert power and regain some credibility that it lost in the wake of Imran Khan’s ouster and subsequent jail term to him. The episode gives the Pak army a new lease of life.

Have we committed enough damage to force them to go into a strategic shift on the issue of state-sponsored terrorism? As far as I understand it, no high-ranking terrorist leader was eliminated; just lower level cadres got killed and buildings were gutted. Both are highly replaceable in a country like Pakistan. After April 22, our political leadership was giving clear hints about our attack. Didn’t it prepare the main terrorist leaders to take shelter at safer places? It’s suitable to have covert operations against high-ranking terror lynchpins. But that doesn’t allow you to claim it directly from public platforms. So this proclivity to claim and do things publicly for political rhetoric, theatrics and optics and launching narratives is a big handicap to our real and effective counter-terror operations (both covert and overt). Among all these issues, aren’t we missing the main thing: What happened to the real perpetrators of Pahalgam killings? There is no clue about them. Earth ate them or sky gobbled them?

By giving into their baiting—in reacting in the most expected way and at the expected time—we have created a show-casing and branding opportunity for the Chinese weapons. Their stock prices have gone up. While we are now in an almost perpetual war mode against Pakistan. It’s costly. It’ll hamper our economic rise. That’s what China wants.

We aren’t smart enemies. We thunder about our upcoming actions from public rallies instead of managing things covertly. It internationalizes the issues—like it does Kashmir at the moment. It’s a sad fact that everything has to be claimed by the political leadership. It forewarns the enemy and brings outside players into the picture. It puts lots of pressure on our diplomatic resources. On the other hand, China is a very smart enemy; doesn’t make anything public; absolutely cunning. It brings the surprise element into play—a big weapon in itself. In comparison, we are childish adversaries, always rabble rousing to boost our image of a super-strong state, which doesn’t match with reality at present. In effect, it doesn’t bring effective actions against the enemy. Rhetoric, symbolism and event management can’t cover all the loopholes. These are poor steps to external war. Cold, calculative, secret—these are the main tools to win external challenges. But how will our ever-boasting leadership manage all this?

There is another worrisome trend that I see emerging from this episode—politicization of our defense forces. A very senior defense official claimed publicly that anti-aircraft guns were installed on Golden Temple premises. The claim was refuted by the SGPC. Further, in order to avoid answering critical questions on national security, army documentaries and interviews with defense personnel were played in the media. It seems that the civilian leadership was taking a shield behind the respectable image of our defense forces, so that even the most diehard critics won’t question the politically suitable narrative of which army was made a participant. But it’s a worrisome trend for the Indian democracy. Dragging army into politics doesn’t portend well.

The Rafael jets were bought at a very high cost and still its maker did not give us access to its source code, which allows the air force to install extra weapons on the plane. Now, the question arises why was it purchased at such high price without even having access to the source code, which is the basis of a fighter plane’s payload maneuvering. Why was HAL—which was to be its offshore manufacturer under technology transfer agreement signed by the UPA government—pushed out of the deal and replaced by a non-experienced private entity owned by a big business house in India? Doesn’t it feel like a decision taken on trading priorities, rather than real strategic planning? Let trading be a priority for consumer items. Including critical defense items in the category is quite risky for the national security. Why are they allowing HAL to die slowly? For private entities and their owners?

In a podcast, Subramanyam Swami, the senior BJP leader, says that Pakistan and China downed our five fighter jets.

Indonesia purchased 42 Rafael planes at rupees 1600 crore/plane. We purchased at rupees 2400 crore/plane. Why so much difference? What extra stuff did we receive to shoot the price by so much? A democratic government must not be gagging questions under the pleas of national security because these questions pave the way for national security in the real sense.

Trump’s way of war is using tariffs as weapons. It has jolted the international economic order. An American court challenged his tariff policies as a means to achieve geostrategic targets. The American administration gave an affidavit in the court citing the effectiveness of the American President’s tariff policies. The affidavit claimed that a possible Indo-Pak nuclear flare-up was averted because the American President threatened to impose tariffs on them if they don’t stop fighting. So all those who have been fighting over the pros and cons of the ceasefire are proven to be ignorant lambs—trade and business happens to be the deciding factor behind wars. The rest we create in our enthusiasm, either this side or on the other.

   Sharing the stage with raksha mantri, the air force chief has categorically, in open terms, spelled out the problems faced by the IAF such as shortage of weapons and planes, the deadlines not being met, about ‘patience’ wearing thin and leading to the snapping point, about their ‘control’ in not calling a black sheep a black sheep. This is the most serious public indictment of the political decision-making I have ever heard a senior officer making about the state of affairs. The trolls came out with their virtual guns. Now if Pakistan plays the clipping, does that make him anti-national? Because this is what the trolls say about anyone who raises genuine questions that need answers for the country’s welfare and security.

The main reason that we haven’t reached anywhere near making a fighter jet engine is that we have spent only 3000 crore rupees in research so far during the past three decades, while it takes anywhere between 30000-80000 crore rupees in research and development work for a competitive fighter jet. Why not ask the 18 top billionaires—whose net worth increased by about 40 lakh crore in the last decade—to fund defense equipment research and development through Corporate National Defense Responsibility on the lines of Corporate Social Responsibility? They have been the biggest beneficiaries of governmental policies, so isn’t it now their responsibility to contribute to the cause of national defense? It’s a critical situation. It just can’t be covered with impressive speeches. It needs real work.

     There has been unprecedented use of military operations and posturing for domestic political gains. The PM in military combat fatigues and pilot gear with a swag. We never saw such pictures before. Is it that the clearly defined civil-military boundary is being diluted with senior military officers more visible on public platforms and the civilian leaders presented in military dress? Sindoor yatras were organized to showcase individual politicians’ strength. Very soon the military operation acquired an electioneering shape, as if it was the real objective behind it. While very critical questions remain unanswered. Then the air chief made a statement which was a direct rebuttal to the political vainglory. It was an imploration to get down to handle the ground realities. The rhetoric was further dampened by the CDS’ acceptance that ‘yes’ Indian jets were downed in the operation. ‘The numbers aren’t important. What is important is why they were downed,’ he said at an interview in Singapore. It’s a good question. And good questions will give solutions. But there is a narrative where asking logical questions is branded as treason to the motherland. Now the trolls decide what is patriotic and what is seditious.

China is moving at a fast pace to make sixth generation stealth fighter jet. Here we are entangled in symbolic civil wars on temples, churches, masjids and gurudwaras. We will not become vishwa guru with religious strife, social divides and hollow speeches. Symbolism has limited electoral role. To bring effective change things need to be done on the ground. New generation has to be attracted towards science and technology instead of being turned vagabonds roaming on the roads, shouting patriotic slogans for sheer fun and flouting many social and legal norms alongside. China is moving towards space warfare and here we are caught in the debate of how many of our purchased 4.5 generation jets were downed.

The CDS was humble, honest, confident, brave and thorough professional in accepting ‘tactical mistakes’ on the first night that led to the loss of our fighter jets. But he added that we rectified the mistakes and hit hard with great effect deep in Pakistan. Being honest about mistakes is a mark of strength. Will the political leadership ever accept even a single mistake? Is it politically so harmful to acknowledge some odd mistake? Why is it that accepting a fault appears so incorrect to the politicians? What led to Pahalgam and Pulwama—in terms of intelligence failure—was never accepted. How will you rectify if you don’t own the mistake in the first place. If you keep it secret it makes it possible to bury even credible reports under tons of files because nobody knows the reality, allowing you space to keep the status quo and prioritize resources for other agendas. Whatever might be the reasons for this acceptance, in my opinion the Indian military has tried to put up its image of strict professionalism through this public acknowledgment.

There is another worrying aspect related to our mainstream media. The CDS Anil Chauhan said in an interview that we lost 15% of operational time in ‘countering fake narratives and disinformation’. It raises very serious questions about the nature of content in the Indian media. Fake narratives are very handy in political wars; but the overzealous anchors forget that in a military conflict too much overblown misinformation can harm one’s own defense interests.

By my amateur reckoning in war affairs, we shouldn’t be too much focused on fighter jets. It will be drones, missiles and air defense systems that will acquire the centre stage during the coming times.  There will be swarms of drones like locust swarms descending on crops. These are cheaper; not too much investment like millions of dollars needed for a single aviations machine. The numbers—in terms of drone swarms—when stretched beyond a point can puzzle even the most sophisticated defense system. So we have to look beyond the loss of fighter jets. No point in looking back. That age is bowing out. We can learn some lessons from Operation Spider Web launched by Ukraine against Russia. It validates the lethality and effectiveness of espionage. The operation achieved almost unthinkable targets, hitting deep in Russia, ruining very high value bombers. If we put Operation Sindoor by the side of Operation Spider Web, we will know what to do, what to avoid, and how to do it. Even the names are so indicative of their nature. One is about emotions, symbolism and political in nature, inflicting not much damage at big costs. The other is cold, covert, calculative, hardcore logical and hence deadly in retaliation, inflicting big damage at minimal costs.

The Indian army has always acknowledged its soldiers’ martyrhood and other loss of materials and machinery. This transparency gives it respect and provides a broad, open platform for making positive changes. So the CDS’ statement is welcome. But that said, we have to understand that the CDS is a political appointee, serving as a bridge between the government and the army leadership. It seems the statement made in Singapore is (sadly) implicitly meant to shield any type of political blame falling on the government post Operation Sindoor. In my opinion, it was no ‘tactical mistake’ on the part of the IAF on the first night of strikes; rather it was a ‘tactical limitation’ due to the government’s decision to keep the strikes limited to the terror facilities only. That would put any country’s air force to risk because going for a cross-border strike with air-to-surface missiles only, without targeting their air defense systems is like running into the battlefield with one hand tied. We have to understand that terrorism is a complex web involving fundamentalist religious leaders and Pakistani army elements. You just can’t separately compartmentalize the two and accomplish a symbolic strike to assuage the emotional surge of pain in the domestic audience. So in my reckoning, this loss on the first night of the confrontation is more due to a weak political resolve rather than the IAF’s tactical mistake. If we had given them a really ‘free hand’, I don’t think our armed forces would have gone to strike the terror facilities without limiting or suppressing the enemy’s air defense network. So passing over the ‘political mistake’ as armed forces’ ‘tactical mistake’ looks unjustified.

The CDS stated that how many jets were downed isn’t important. I respect his opinion. They know better as experts. But I think it’s important against the fact that out of nine targets (reportedly) attacked on the first night of the hostilities, only two were given to the air force for striking. The rest were pretty close to the LoC and the army attacked them with drones and artillery fire. So to lose multiple jets to strike two non-military targets is important. And trying to do so without suppressing the enemy’s air defense network is like going into the war with sword only without the shield. So were our armed forces given ‘full freedom’ to deal with the enemy as was reported? And if they were given full freedom, would they be casual enough not to first deal with the Pakistani air defense system?

A lot has happened just within two-three weeks of the ceasefire. Apart from the IMF bailout package, Pakistan has received 800 million dollars loan from the ADB. To rub further salt on our diplomatic wounds, the UNSC has appointed Pakistan as the Vice-Chairman of the anti-terror committee. It clearly shows that we have failed to put Pakistan in the dock even after a serious provocation of the level of Pahalgam massacre. Now as can be safely accepted, Pakistan will buy weapons with the borrowed funds like it has been doing until now. Reports say that the Pakistani leadership has already given 64 crore rupees to a top terror lynchpin to reconstruct his destroyed madrasa. So what are our takeaways from the confrontation and the ceasefire, which we say happened on our conditions? What mission was achieved if we have failed to isolate Pakistan on the issue of terrorism and force it to change its terror policy? Was all this meant to give us emotional entertainment for a few nights by watching misquoting news channels?